This paper investigates some modular powering functions suitable for cryptography. It is well known that the Rabin encryption function is a 4-to-1 mapping and breaking its one-wayness is secure under the factoring assumption. The previously reported encryption schemes using a powering function are variants of either the 4-to-1 mapping or higher n-to-1 mapping, where n > 4. In this paper, we propose an optimized powering function that is a 3-to-1 mapping using a p 2 q-type modulus. The onewayness of the proposed powering function is as hard as the infeasibility of the factoring problem. We present an efficient algorithm for computing the decryption for a p 2 q-type modulus, which requires neither modular inversion nor division. Moreover, we construct new provably secure digital signatures as an application of the optimized functions. In order to achieve provable security in the random oracle model, we usually randomize a message using random hashing or padding. However, we have to compute the randomization again if the randomized message is a non-cubic residue element-it is inefficient for long messages. We propose an algorithm that can deterministically find the unique cubic residue element for a randomly chosen element.
Introduction
Modular powering functions with composite moduli play an important role in cryptography. The RSA cryptosystem [16] and its variations [2] , [3] use one-to-one modular powering functions (permutations) as primitives. The Rabin cryptosystem [15] and its variants such as Williams' scheme [20] and Kurosawa et al.'s schemes [8] , [9] are composed of modular squaring functions (4-to-1 mapping). The other encryption schemes using powering functions [11] , [17] , [21] , [22] utilize n-to-1 mappings (n ≥ 4). Although the types of moduli for these functions are various, the following types are mainly used: pq, pqr and p 2 q (e.g. [5] , [7] , [14] , [19] ), where p, q, r are distinct prime numbers. The pqr-type modulus can efficiently compute its decryption using the Chinese remainder theorem [14] , and the p 2 q-type modulus can achieve faster decryption through the addition of Hensel lifting [7] , [19] .
These various kinds of functions have advantages and disadvantages. In cryptographic use, we expect that these functions will be proven to be one-way under some reliable † † The author is with the School of Systems Information Science, Future University-Hakodate, Hakodate-shi, 041-8655 Japan.
* This paper was presented at ASIACRYPT2003. a) E-mail: hisato@sdl.hitachi.co.jp DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e89-a. 1.81 assumptions such as the infeasibility of factoring large composite numbers. In view of this, strictly speaking, computational equivalence between one-wayness and the infeasibility of factoring is not proven for RSA functions. On the other hand, it is proven that Rabin functions are one-way under the factoring assumptions. However, for pq and p 2 qtype moduli, these functions are 4-to-1, where four is the cardinality of the kernel (for pqr-type, the functions are 8-to-1), and this causes some inconvenience in cryptography such as non-uniqueness in decryption. In avoiding this, additional treatment is required for decryption or efficiency is decreased, and thus a smaller kernel would better suit for our purposes. Moreover, for a p 2 q-type modulus, the conventional methods ( [7] , [19] ) require modular inverses and integer divisions to be calculated. Even though these operations are fast in software, they are relatively expensive in hardware, especially for smartcards that are not equipped with coprocessors to calculate these inverses and divisions.
In this paper, we investigate optimized modular powering functions whose one-wayness can be proven secure under factoring assumptions. We deal with the general powering function f (x) = x e mod n for modulus n = p d q. We show some criteria related to parameters g, d, p, q, which determine the number of pre-images of f (x). We conclude that the optimal encryption of our proposed scheme is a 3-to-1 mapping with the p 2 q-type modulus. Moreover, we propose an efficient algorithm to calculate the preimages of a p 2 qtype modulus, which needs neither modular inversion nor division of integers. Moreover, as an application of these optimized functions, we construct new provably secure digital signatures using these functions in the random oracle model. In order to achieve the security in the random oracle model, we randomize a message using a random hashing or padding. If the randomized message is a non-cubic element, we have to randomize it again before the primitive computation-it is inefficient for long messages. In this paper, we propose an algorithm, with which the three possible kernel elements can easily be distinguished by a non-cubic residue element. This trick was initially proposed by Kurosawa et al. for the Rabin signature scheme [9] . Finally, we estimate the efficiency of the proposed signature scheme in contrast with other conventional signature schemes. The decryption of the proposed scheme with a p 2 q-type modulus is asymptotically about 1.5 times faster than that of the MultiPrime RSA with a pqr-type modulus of the same size. This paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we discuss the proposed primitives and propose an optimal powCopyright c 2006 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers ering function. Section 3 discuss our construction of digital signature schemes based on the optimal powering function. Section 4 concludes the paper with a few closing remarks.
Proposed Primitives
In this section, we first study generalized powering functions with respect to security, efficiency and convenience for cryptography, and we then propose a new type of function that has not been applied to cryptography, that is, the conditions for prime factors of the modulus are asymmetric. In the following, because of efficiency, we concentrate on moduli of the powering functions that have two distinct prime factors (cf. Sect. 3.4).
Generalized Powering Functions
Let us recall the general properties of powering functions over some finite rings.
We deal with a modulus N = p d q, where p and q are distinct odd prime numbers and d ≥ 1 a positive integer † . Let us denote the g-th power map on the multiplicative group Z *
Note that f is a g p g q -to-one map, and the image of f is equal to (Z *
Let y be an element in the image of f , then the preimage of y by f is the set given by f −1 (y) = {x ∈ Z * N | x g = y}, which consists of g p g q elements. We choose g = 2 for the Rabin cryptosystem, so that there are four ambiguities for the preimage of map f due to g p = g q = 2.
We denote the isomorphism by the Chinese remainder
As is well known, the multiplicative group Z * p is a cyclic group of order p − 1. For an integer t ≥ 1, let Z p,t be the subgroup of elements in Z * p whose order divides t: 
then, due to the above, we have the following.
Lemma 2.1:
For any x ∈ Z * p , we have χ p,g (x) ∈ ζ p,g , and x is a g-th power residue (i.e. x ∈ Z * p g
) if and only if
, and a ∈ Z * p d is a g-th power residue if and only if a mod p satisfies the condition in Lemma 2.1. For the prime q, the situation is similar, let Z q,g = ζ q,g , then by the Chinese remainder theorem, the set Z N,g of all g-th roots of unity in Z * N can be written as 
Consequently, for y ∈ Z * N g , let x ∈ f −1 (y) be a preimage of y : x g = y, then the preimage f −1 (y) of y by f can easily be calculated by the following:
Security of Generalized Powering Functions
We will now consider computational equivalence between the factoring problem on N and the one-wayness of function f , when f is not injective. For each divisor e of g, define the set of primes which satisfy the conditions in Lemma 2.10 as follows: P e = p : prime | gcd(g, p − 1) = e, gcd(g, (p − 1)/e) = 1 .
Let Div(g) be the set of all divisors of g. For a nonempty set D ⊂ Div(g), we put P D = e∈D P e . We fix integers d ≥ 1, g ≥ 2, and non-empty sets
{1} (namely, one of these contains divisors of g besides 1). For these, let a instance generator G 0 be a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm such that G 0 (1 k 
we also assume that (p, q) P 1 × P 1 ). Using these notations, we define the factoring problem and its infeasibility. 
Definition 2.5:
A PPT algorithm A is said to (t, )-break f if for any k ∈ N, after at most t(k) processing time, it calculates a preimage of f with probability at least (k). f is (t, )-secure if there exists no PPT algorithm which (t, )-breaks.
Let ϕ be the Euler totient function. Under these definitions, we can prove the following theorem, whose proof can be found in Appendix A. Theorem 2.6: Fix integers d ≥ 1 and g ≥ 2, and assume that all divisors of g can be efficiently computed. Fix non-empty sets
, and for any e 1 ∈ D 1 and e 2 ∈ D 2 , assume that { e| gcd(e 1 ,e 2 ) ϕ(e) 2 }/e 1 e 2 is small. Moreover, we put τ = min e 1 ∈D 1 ,e 2 ∈D 2 1 − e| gcd(e 1 ,e 2 ) ϕ(e) 2 /e 1 e 2 . (Notice that by the assumptions, τ is close to 1) Let G 0 be the instance generator for the above parameters, and
According to the argument in Sect. 2.3, the inverse of f can be calculated using the factors of N, hence, together with the argument in this section, it is proven that the equivalence between the infeasibility of the factoring problem on N and the one-wayness of f .
Efficient Decryption Algorithms
In this section, we consider an efficient algorithm that can be used to calculate the preimage of the powering function considered in Sect. 2.1, when the prime factors p and q are known. In the case d > 1, the conventional method (e.g. [7] , [19] ) needs the modular inverse to be calculated. We now propose an algorithm that does not need the modular inverse to be calculated under some conditions on p, q and g. The proofs for the following are in Appendix B. The notations p, q, d, N and g are the same as in Sect. 2.1. Let z = p −1 mod q.
For y ∈ Z * N g , we put y p = y mod p, y q = y mod q and
. Similarly, let x q be a g-th root of y q : x g q ≡ y q (mod q). Then, by the Chinese remainder theorem, a g-th root of y modulo pq is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.7: By the isomorphism
which is given by x 1 = x p + p (x q − x p )z mod q , and x 1 is a g-th root of y 1 (= y mod pq).
By using the g-th roots of y ∈ Z * N g in modulus p, q and pq, we can calculate the g-th root of y in the high-power modulus (p i q, i = 2, 3, . . . , d) as we will see in the following.
Lemma 2.8:
The notations are the same as in the above. Let η y = (gx
Though it needs to calculate a modular inverse modulo p for η y , under some condition, we can have η y efficiently. Lemma 2.9: Assume that there exists some integer 0 ≤ α < p − 1 depending only on p and g such that
This follows from y α−1
mod p by single modular multiplication.
Let us next consider the conditions in Lemma 2.9. That is, let us consider the relation between p and g so that there exists an integer α which depends only on p and g, such that for any a ∈ Z * p g , a α is a g-th root of a ((a α ) g = a).
Proposition 2.10:
Let p be a prime, 1 < g < p − 1 be an integer. Then there exists an integer α = α(p, g) (1 ≤ α < p−1) which depends only on p and g, and satisfies (a α ) g = a for any a ∈ Z * p g if and only if gcd(g, (p − 1)/g 0 ) = 1 where
Using the above discussion, if for p and q, g satisfies the conditions in Lemma 2.10, we have an efficient algorithm which calculates a g-th root (Note that using a g-th root, all g-th root are easily given. See Sect. 2.1).
Corollary 2.11:
Let p, q be prime integers. Let d > 1 be an integer, and
Choices of Cryptographically Suitable Powering Functions
We will discuss the optimal choice of parameters g, g p , g q Table 1 Parameters for 2 ≤ g ≤ 8. 
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and d suitable for cryptography in the following. Efficiency must be considered, when we apply powering functions that can be proven to be one-way under the assumption of infeasibility of the integer factoring problem to cryptosystems. The cost of calculating the image will be lower if the powering index is smaller. Moreover, if the number of preimages is larger, then there will be some inconvenience as previously mentioned. Table 1 shows all possibilities of g p , g q for relatively small g's. Note that cases where p and q are replaced have been omitted, and for even g, the parities of g p and g q (even or odd) coincide. Note also that the case (g, g p , g q ) = (2, 2, 2) (and d = 1) corresponds to the Rabin function. The value g p · g q indicates that the g-th power function f is a (g p · g q )-to-1 mapping and is desired to be small. τ is the constant coefficient appearing in the reduction probability of Theorem 2.6 (See also Appendix A for more details). Although a larger value is desired, it is sufficient if it is greater than 0.5. From this table, we can conclude that the case (g, g p , g q ) = (3, 1, 3) (or (g, g p , g q ) = (3, 3, 1) ), that has smallest g p ·g q , is optimized for cryptosystems (ratio is 0.667 and sufficiently large).
Moreover, as we will see in Sect. 3.4, the p d q-type modulus (d ≥ 2) makes the preimage calculation more efficient using the proposed algorithm in Sect. 2.3. Thus letting F (= f N,3 ) be the (3,1,3 
Application to Digital Signatures
As cryptographic applications of the arguments in the previous sections, we propose digital signature schemes using the cubic function considered in Sect. 2.4 and ensure the advantages of the proposed cubic function, especially in terms of efficiency (Sect. 3.4). According to [4] , use of small exponent d is suitable for cryptography. Moreover, the factoring method using elliptic curves [10] is based on only the length of prime factors, hence |p| = |q| must be greater than some lower bound, and the size of the modulus N = p d q will have an effect on efficiency. Thus, we can conclude that d = 2 and d = 3 are most suitable for cryptographic use. In the following, we will concentrate on the case d = 2 for simplicity and explicit description.
Basic Notation
We start by recalling the basic notion of digital signature schemes according to [3] , [6] , [13] .
Definition 3.1: A signature scheme (G, S, V) is defined as follows:
The key generation algorithm G is a PPT algorithm which has input 1 k and outputs a pair of matching public and secret keys (pk, sk).
The signature generation algorithm S takes a message M to be signed and public and secret keys (pk, sk), and outputs a signature x = S pk,sk (M).
The signature verification algorithm V takes a message M, a candidate signature x and public key pk, and outputs a bit V pk (M, x ), equal to 1 if the signature is accepted and 0 otherwise. We require that if x = S pk,sk , then V pk (M, x ) = 1.
On the security for signatures, we only deal with existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack which is the strongest notion ( [3] , [6] ). In this scenario, a forger of a signature can dynamically obtain signatures of messages of his choice and attempts to output a valid signature, where a pair of message and signature (M, x) is said to be a valid forgery if V pk (M, x) = 1 and the signature of M was never requested by the forger.
Most signature schemes use hash functions, and the security is proven over random oracle model, that is the model which replaces the hash functions with random oracles ([1]) appropriately. In this model, forgers are allowed to access to random oracles. The resistance against these attacks is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2:
A forger A (a PPT algorithm) is said to (t, q h , q s , )-breaks the signature scheme (G, S, V) if after at most q h (k) queries to the hash oracles, q s (k) signature queries and t(k) processing time, it outputs a valid forgery with probability at least (k) (for any k ∈ N). A signature scheme (G, S, V) is (t, q h , q s , )-secure if there exists no forger who (t, q h , q s , )-breaks the scheme.
Proposed Signature Scheme: Scheme 1
We now propose new signatures constructed with the (3,1,3)-type cubic residue function F in Sect. 2.4 (in case d = 2). These are proven to be secure under the assumption of integer factoring infeasibility.
First, we will consider the (full domain) hash & sign (F-FDHS) signature which is most fundamental. Fix an integer a > 1 (regard a as a system parameter).
Key Generation
Generate randomly same length distinct prime numbers p and q such that p ≡ 2 (mod 3), q ≡ 4 or 7 (mod 9), and choose a non-cubic residue a modulo q, put N = p 2 q. Let H : {0, 1} * → Z * N be a hash function. Then output the public key (N, H) and the secret key (p, q) (a is open to public as a system parameter).
Signature Generation 1. For a message M, calculate w = H(M).

Let y be one of w, aw, a
2 w which is a cubic residue. 3. Calculate a cubic root x of y (x ∈ F −1 (y)).
Output x and end.
Signature Verification 1. For the message M, calculate w = H(M).
Calculate y = x
3 mod N. 3. If y coincides one of w , aw , a 2 w , then output 1, else output 0 and end.
Remark 3.3:
Note that from Lemma 2.1, we can easily seen that one of w, aw or a 2 w is a cubic residue, and we can determine this by calculating χ p,3 (this function is also a powering function). Therefore, we do not have to recompute the hash value H(M), and for a given message m we can uniquely generate the signature x of m. Kurosawa et al. proposed a similar technique for the Rabin signature [9] .
We can prove that F-FDHS is secure over the random oracle model (the hash function H is replaced to the random oracles) under the assumption of integer factoring infeasibility. The proof is basically similar to that of [9] .
For the fixed a and a positive integer k, let
, and put N = k N k . Then we can prove the following theorem, whose proof can be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.4: If
In the following, combining the idea in Lemma 2.1 and Corollary 2.11, we propose an efficient algorithm, denoted by Φ, which for given w ∈ Z * N , determines which of w, aw or a 2 w is a cubic residue, and then calculates its cubic root. The validity of the algorithm can be found in Appendix D.
Let γ = (p + 1)/3 and z = p −1 mod q. Let β p = (2p − 4)/3 and β q = (2q − 8)/9, ζ = a (q−1)/3 mod q if q ≡ 4 (mod 9), β q = (q − 7)/9, ζ = a (2(q−1))/3 mod q if q ≡ 7 (mod 9). Finally, let b = a β q +1 mod q.
3 mod N ∈ {w, aw mod N, a 2 w mod N}. 1. Check the cubic residuosity modq and calculate a cubic root: 1.1. w q = w mod q. 2.1.
Other Constructions: Schemes 2 and 3
In the following, we present two additional constructions of digital signatures based on the generalized powering function.
Scheme 2
Let us consider a scheme F-2HS (2-hash and sign, Fig. 1 ) that has been slightly changed from scheme 1 : F-FDHS. Similarly, fix an integer a > 1 and let k 1 be a positive integer such that k 1 < |N| − 1, k 2 := |N| − k 1 − 1, and regard these as system parameters in addition to a in scheme 1. The key generation is the same as for scheme 1 except for letting H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k 1 and G : {0, 1} k 1 → {0, 1} k 2 be hash functions (H: compressor, G: generator). The public key is (N, H, G) , and the secret key is (p, q).
Signature Generation 1. For a message
and let w = w 1 ||w 2 . 2. Let y be one of w, aw, a 2 w which is a cubic residue. 3. Calculate a cubic root x of y (x ∈ F −1 (y)). This scheme can also be proven to be secure over the random oracle model (the hash functions H and G are replaced with random oracles) under the factoring assumption. Let N be the same as in scheme 1. We then have the following:
This scheme is nothing more than a version of PSS ( [3] ) without the random numbers part, and is not essentially different from scheme 1. However, with respect to implementation, we bother with the construction of hash functions with long output using some short output functions (e.g. [18] ), and in most cases, it is inefficient when the hash function deals with very long messages. For example, using a hash function with 256-bit output for constructing a long output (say 1024-bit) function by KDF construction ( [18] ), we have to hash a message 4 times or more by the hash function. On the other hand, in scheme 2, only one hashing of a message is needed.
Scheme 3
Finally, we will consider a message recovery signature scheme F-MR (message recovery) based on scheme 2 : F-2HS. For this scheme, the message length is restricted to |M| = k 2 . The key generation and signature generation are the same as in scheme 2, except that we set w 2 = G(w 1 ) ⊕ M in Step 1 of the signature generation (Fig. 2) . The signature verification and message recovery are as follows: Similarly for this scheme, we can prove following:
Similar to scheme 2, this scheme is nothing more than a version of PSS-R ( [3] ) without the random number part, and this makes the message embedded in the signature longer than that of PSS-R.
As we have seen, the proposed schemes need no trial and error in hashing messages and finding the cubic residue.
This has a good effect on efficiency especially with huge messages. In what follows, we discuss the advantages in efficiency of the proposed schemes in detail.
Efficiency Consideration
In this section, we estimate the efficiency of signature schemes 1, 2 and 3 introduced in the previous sections.
The proposed schemes deal with the modulus of N = p 2 q (|p| ≈ |q|). In order to fairly compare the proposed schemes with the RSA signature, we estimate the efficiency of a fast variant of RSA signature, namely Multi-Prime RSA with N = pqr (|p| ≈ |q| ≈ |r|) [14] . We consider the efficiency of signature generation which has higher costs in comparison with signature verification. Note that Multiprime (pqr-type) Rabin's scheme has the same efficiency as RSA signature in verification.
The efficiency of public-key cryptosystems and digital signatures is frequently estimated by the number of modular multiplications. Let us introduce the following notations to represent the amount of calculation. Let Mul(t) denote the amount of calculation for an integer multiplication of t-bit integers. Similarly, let RMul(t) be that for a modular multiplication with a t-bit modulus, and Red(s, t) that for a reduction s-bit integer with a t-bit modulus. Also, let RP(t) be the number of t-bit modulus modular multiplications for powering with a t-bit exponent.
In Schemes 1, 2 and 3, the steps for checking the cubic residuosity and calculating a cubic root (function Φ in Sect. 3.2), comprise a large percentage of signature generation. Thus we consider the efficiency of Φ. Let be the bit-length of modulus N = p 2 q (|p| ≈ |q|). Signature generation needs the following amount of calculation: 8
On the other hand, let be the bit-length of MultiPrime RSA modulus N = pqr (|p| ≈ |q| ≈ |r|), then for the generation of Multi-Prime RSA signature [14] , it needs 1
We have approximately RMul(t) ≈ n 2 · RMul(t/n), Mul(t) ≈ (1/2) · RMul(t). Moreover, if we use the Montgomery method [12] for modular reduction, then we have Red(t, t/n) ≈ (n + 1)/n 2 · RMul(t). Letting t = and n = 3, we have RMul( ) ≈ 9 · RMul( /3), Mul( ) ≈ (1/2) · RMul( ) and Red( , /3) ≈ (4/9) · RMul( ). Thus substituting these to the above, the amounts of calculation for the signature generation of the proposed and RSA schemes are given by Proposed schemes : {29/6 + (2/9)RP( /3)} RMul( ), Multi-Prime RSA : {3/2 + (1/3)RP( /3)} RMul( ).
For modular powering, we adopt the basic binary method. If we assume that half the bits in the exponent are non-zero, then this method needs 3t/2 modular multiplications with a t-bit modulus (where we also assume that modular squaring and modular multiplication have the same amount of calculation). Thus we have RP( /3) ≈ (3/2)( /3) = /2. Taking all this into account, the number of modular multiplications in the proposed schemes and the RSA signature are as follows:
Proposed Schemes : (29/6 + /9) RMul( ), Multi-Prime RSA : (3/2 + /6) RMul( ).
Hence we can see that the ratio {Multi-Prime RSA/Proposed scheme} asymptotically goes to 1.5 as becomes large. Thus, we can say that the proposed schemes are considerably more efficient in signature generation than Multi-Prime RSA signature. Similarly, we can see that the proposed schemes are two or more times more efficient than the pq-type RSA-CRT signature.
Summary
We studied modular powering functions suitable for cryptography. In particular, we proposed a 3-to-1 functions, which can be proven to be one-way under the factoring assumption. The three ambiguities of the kernel can easily be distinguished by a non-cubic residue element. For the p d qtype modulus (d ≥ 2), we proposed a more efficient method of calculating preimages for these functions, which requires no modular inversion algorithm for Hensel lifting. Thus we can say that the proposed functions are optimized in terms of security and efficiency.
As cryptographic applications, we also proposed new digital signature schemes which utilize the new functions with d = 2. Finally, we showed that the proposed schemes are about 1.5 times more efficient than Multi-Prime RSA with the same length modulus (more than two times faster than the pq-type RSA-CRT signature). 1), g q = gcd(g, q − 1), then f is g p g q : 1 (g p g q > 1) function (Of course, the adversary does not know p, q, but she knows that f is not injective). We assume that there exists a PPT algorithm A which computes a preimage of f . That is, A has input k, d, g, D 1 , D 2 , N, y, and it outputs x in f −1 (y) = {x ∈ Z * N | x g = y} with non-negligible probability. Using A, we construct an algorithm M which factors N as follows:
For each divisor e of g, calculate w = gcd((z e − 1 mod N), N), if w is non-trivial divisor of N, then output w and end, otherwise Fail.
In
Step 6, it outputs non-trivial divisor w if and only if z ∈ G N,g , hence the success probability in Step 6 is equal to g N,g /g p g q . If we put the success probability of A (that is, the probability such that it does not Fail in Step 4) to Adv(A) = , then, by Lemma A.2, the final success probability of M, namely, the probability such that M factors N, is equal to
which is non-negligible by the assumptions.
Appendix B: Proofs of Lemmas in Sect. 2.3
Proof of Lemma 2.8: By the assumptions, we have
, and by the assumption on x i and the definition of η y , we have gx
Proof of Proposition 2.10: Let a be a generator of the cyclic group Z * p g . The order of a is equal to (p − 1)/g 0 . If there exists an integer α which satisfies the condition, we have (a α ) g = a, thus it must be α · g ≡ 1 (mod (p − 1)/g 0 ). That is, g must be prime to (p − 1)/g 0 . Conversely, if gcd(g, (p − 1)/g 0 ) = 1, then let α be as above, it is directly checked that it satisfies the condition. As the order of a is (p − 1)/g 0 , we have a αg ≡ a 1+u{(p−1)/g 0 } ≡ a (mod p). Moreover, u ≡ {−(p − 1)/g 0 } −1 (mod g), hence the numerator of α is divided by g, thus α is an integer. Since u ≤ g − 1, g 0 ≤ g < p − 1, we have 1 + u{(p − 1)/g 0 } ≤ 1 + (g − 1){(p − 1)/g 0 } < g(p − 1)/g 0 ≤ g(p − 1). Thus α satisfies 1 ≤ α < p − 1.
Appendix C: Proofs of the Security of Proposed Schemes
Proof of Theorem 3.4: Let A be a forger which (t, q H , q s , )-breaks the signature scheme F-FDH. The input of A is a public key (N, a) . A has oracle access to random oracle H. Then we construct the factoring algorithm I which can (t I , I )-break by using A. The input of I is N ∈ N. Firstly, I randomly chooses a with |a| < |q|. a will be a non-cubic residue with probability 2/3. Then I gives (N, a) to A as the public key. In the following, we assume that a is non-cubic residue, namely, (N, a) is a valid public key. After this, A begins to make sign queries and hash queries. For these queries, I behaves as follows.
If A makes a sign query without having made the corresponding hash query, I at once goes ahead and makes the hash query itself, and then corresponds for sign query as described below. Similarly for the output forgery, thus we may assume that if A makes a sign query or outputs a forgery, then it has already made corresponding hash query. Hence, effective number of hash queries is at most q(k) = q H (k) + q s (k) + 1.
To answer queries, I makes the query-mapping table Finally, suppose that A outputs a forgery (m,ŝ). Ifŝ is valid, then for some i, a i H(m) =ŝ 3 mod N. N is chosen randomly and H is random from our construction of I. Hence A can not distinguish the behavior of I from the original game, thus A succeeds this simulation with original success probability .
On the other hand, by the assumption,m ∈ Q, thus there exists the corresponding (m,r, i, H(m)) ∈ A and it holdsr 3 =ŝ 3 mod N. Suppose thatŝ is valid. From the argument in Theorem 2.6, using the above equations (ifr ŝ), a non-trivial factor of N can be calculated with success probability 2/3. Taking into account the probability such that a is non-cubic residue, I succeeds in factoring N with probability I = (2/3) 2 . Let t 0 (k) be processing time for a modular multiplication with k-bit modulus. I carries out 3-modular multiplications for each hash query, hence also from Theorem 2.6, the processing time t of I is given by t ≤ t + O(k 3 ) + 3(q H + q s + 1)t 0 (k) = t + (q H + q s + 2)O(k 3 ).
Proof of Theorem 3.5, 3.6: Theorem 3.5 can be proven just like PSS and PSS-R in [3] , combining with the proof of Theorem 3.4. We omit the detail.
